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This Essay examines what I call 'post-parodies" in apparel. This emerging
genre of do-it-yourself fashion is characterized by the appropriation and
modification of third-party trademarks-not for the sake of dismissively mocking
or zealously glorifying luxury fashion, but rather to engage in more complex
forms of expression. I examine the cultural circumstances and psychological
factors giving rise to post-parodic fashion, and conclude that the sensibility
causing its proliferation is grounded in ambivalence.
Unfortunately, current doctrine governing trademark "parodies" cannot
begin to make sense of post-parodic goods; among other shortcomings, that
doctrine suffers from crude analytical tools and a cramped view of "worthy"
expression. I argue that trademark law-at least, if it hopes to determine
post-parodies' lawfulness in a meaningful way-is asking the wrong questions,
and that existing 'parody" doctrine should be supplanted by a more thoughtful
and nuanced framework.
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"[What most prevents us] from grasping what people are up to is not [so much]
ignorance as to how cognition works .. as a lack offamiliarity with the imaginative
universe within which their acts are signs."
-Clifford Geertz1
"First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose
jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed."
-Judge Pierre N. Leval
2
I. THE RISE OF THE "POST-PARODY"
A. An Unusual T-Shirt Catches My Eye
While riding
unusual shirt:
the New York City subway late last year, I noticed an
Figure 1: "Homi6s South Central"'
1 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 13 (1973).
2 Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 8o9 F. Supp. 267, 28o (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
3 Brian Lichtenberg, Black Homies Tee with Gold Foil, BRIAN LICHTENBERG, http://www.
shopbrianlichtenberg.com/black-homies-tee-with-gold-foil.html (last visited Aug. t8, 2014).
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The shirt had obviously been designed to evoke the genteel horse-and-
buggy trademark of Hermhs, the storied French fashion house:
Figure 2: "Hermes Paris" Horse-and-Buggy Trademark4
Less clear, however, was the message the shirt sought to convey. Perhaps
its designer wished to highlight the stark difference between the moneyed,
old-world fantasy of Hermhs and the less glamorous reality of South
Central Los Angeles-home to the troubled City of Compton' and the
birthplace of "gangsta rap."6 Instead of a dapper groom beside a horse-and-
buggy, the individual depicted on the black and gold shirt stands beside
what appears to be a broken-down truck. "Hermhs" is displaced by "Homi&s,"
with the accent preserved (though flipped) to reinforce the reference.
I went online to find out whether the "Homi&s" shirt was in fact intended
to express its designer's "[a]nger at being poor, black, disenfranchised,
abused, stereotyped, blamed, mistreated, [and] ignored."' No, it turned
out-not at all. The man behind the shirt, Brian Lichtenberg, was not
African-American, and he professed no particular political agenda, let alone
4 William Stolerman, Hermes Ends Partnership with Wally, LUXURY INSIDER (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.luxury-insider.com/luxury-news/2010/03/hermes-ends-partnership-with-wally.
5 See Rory Carroll, Aja Brown, Compton's New Mayor: 'I See It as a New Brooklyn,' THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2013, 11:38 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2o13/oct/15/aja-brown-
compton- new- mayor-sees-brooklyn (recounting how 198os rap group N.W.A.'s double-platinum
album Straight Outta Compton "captured the rage of an underclass trapped by urban decay, drugs,
gang violence and despair" and "immortalised Compton, an impoverished sprawl south of Los
Angeles, for all the wrong reasons"). Although Compton has changed substantially over the past
thirty years, "many still consider [it] one of America's murder capitals." Id.
6 "Gangsta rap" often contains "stories about crime, gunplay, raw sex and hatred for the
police." Jon Pareles, Music; Still Tough, Still Authentic. Still Relevant?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/14/arts/music-still-tough-still-authentic-still-relevant.html.
7 Claudia Calhoun, 7he DefJam Generation, THE PALEY CENTER FOR MEDIA, http://www.
paleycenter.org/the-emergence-of-hip-hop (last visited Aug. t8, 2014).
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one focused on race, poverty, or violence.8 His website stressed merchandising,
not messaging; it peddled shoes, 9 knitted caps,10 and various knick-knacks, 1
evoking not only Hermes, but numerous high-end fashion houses.12
One of Lichtenberg's other shirts made an ideological interpretation of
the Homi6s shirt seem even more far-fetched. That shirt began with the
same visual motif, but went on to emphasize leisure and friendship. The
words "South Central" were gone; in their place was the phrase "Rollin'
with the Homi6s," transforming the seemingly dilapidated truck into a
buoyant joyride. 3
8 See Brian Lichtenberg, Bio, BRIAN LICHTENBERG, http://brianlichtenberg.com/bio.html
(last visited Aug. t8, 2014) (expressing Lichtenberg's devotion to his "chic sensibility" and
mentioning no specific social cause).
9 Brian Lichtenberg, Homies Black - White Slip Ons (Mens), BRIAN LICHTENBERG, http://
www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/bltee/mens-shoes-footwear/homies-black-white-slip-ons-mens.
html (last visited Aug. t8, 2014).
10 Brian Lichtenberg, Charcoal Homies Beanie with White Embroidery, BRIAN LICHTENBERG,
http://www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/best-sellers/charcoal-homies-beanie-with-white-embroidery.html
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
11 See, e.g., Brian Lichtenberg, Black Homies Graffiti Zipper Pouch with Gold Foil, BRIAN
LICHTENBERG, http://www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/new-arrivals/homies-graffiti-zipper-pouch.html
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
12 See generally Brian Lichtenberg, Best Sellers, BRIAN LICHTENBERG, http://
www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/best-sellers.html (last visited Aug. t8, 2014) (advertising "Homi6s,"
"F6line," and "Ballin" merchandise).
13 See generally Chris Martins, Hear JDilla's 'Trucks,' a Gangstafied Gary Numan Tribute, SPIN
(Apr. 17, 2013, ii:o6 AM), http://www.spin.com/articles/j-dilla-trucks-gary-numan-cars-vocal-
unreleased ("'Trucks' playfully turns the New Wave legend's 'Cars' into a dedication to 'big ass
trucks with big ass rims."').
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Figure 3: "Rollin' with the Homi6s 1 4
Any remaining possibility of a traditional "political agenda" on Lichtenberg's
part was dashed by the next shirt I encountered: a "muscle tee" designed to
evoke the logo of the high-end French fashion house C6line.
Figure 4: "F61ine Meow"5
14 Brian Lichtenberg, Black Rollin with the Homies Tee with Gold Foil, BRIAN LICHTENBERG,
http://www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/bltee/tees/black-rollin-with-the-homies-tee-with-gold-
foil.html (last visited Aug. t8, 2014).
15 Brian Lichtenberg, White Feline Muscle Tee with Black Ink, BRIAN LICHTENBERG,
http://www.shopbrianlichtenberg.com/white-feline-muscle-tee-with-black-ink.html (last visited
Aug. 18, 2014).
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Clearly, Lichtenberg's main objective was not to create apparel that
would empower the marginalized. Indeed, the designer's biography took
pains to emphasize that he was not on society's margins, but rather in its
spotlight. 16 The bio went on to articulate Lichenberg's creative ethos:
Since the beginning, [Lichtenberg] has drawn inspiration from a host of
creative friends, none of whom were ever slaves to fashion trends, but instead
to genuine self-expression and creativity. [Based in Los Angeles rather than
New York or Europe, Lichtenberg] has the luxury of operating "outside the
box," so to speak. It is from this place that Lichtenberg has had the freedom
to take fashion into consideration without ever taking it too seriously.
Tongue firmly planted in cheek, Lichtenberg's designs are at the same time
both reverential and autonomous. 1
7
Of course, poking fun at fashion-even by the rich and famous-is hardly
a new trick. In Lichtenberg's lifetime alone, we have giggled at the outrageous
designers and models paraded through Zoolander 8 and snickered at the
haughty fashion editors skewered by The Devil Wears Prada.19 Long before
Lichtenberg, nineteenth-century writer Thomas Carlyle amused readers
with his description of the so-called "dandy," "a witness and living Martyr
to the eternal worth of Clothes." 20 Before that, there was James Gillray,
whose late eighteenth-century comedic etchings delighted the public by
mocking "the follies of contemporary fashion." 21 And over four centuries
ago, playwright John Vanbrugh had theatergoers rolling in the aisles at the
antics of "Lord Foppington," a character who at one point interrupts a
swordfight to compliment his opponent's cuffs. 22
Still, something distinguished Lichtenberg's work from the satire
preceding it; his apparel was more than an easy laugh at fashion's expense.
The simultaneously "reverential and autonomous" character of his products
had a subtler flavor-a more complex relationship with fashion-that
warranted further investigation. To better understand what Lichtenberg
16 See Brian Lichtenberg, supra note 8 (claiming that "the California native has been the go-to
designer for the music industry's biggest pop stars for over a decade").
17 Id.
18 ZOOLANDER (Paramount Pictures 2001).
19 THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA (Fox 2000 Pictures 2oo6).
20 Thomas Carlyle, The Dandiacal Body, in THE RISE OF FASHION: A READER 166, 166
(Daniel Leonhard Purdy ed., 2004).
21 Christopher Breward, THE CULTURE OF FASHION III (199S).
22 See Matt Wolf, Review: 'he Relapse,' VARIETY (July 27, 2001, 2:01 PM), http://variety.
com/2oo/legit/reviews/the-relapse-1200468966 (describing Lord Foppington's character as "a
periwigged Elton John gone gloriously over the top, and beyond").
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was up to, I needed context; I thus turned to Google to locate other apparel
displaying Lichtenberg's sensibility.
It took no more than a few searches to discover that such goods were
plentiful. To be sure, many of the shirts, hats, and other items I came across
were thinly veiled knockoffs, putting a slight twist on high-end fashion
trademarks to make a quick buck. But other works, like Lichtenberg's, were
more creative, borrowing the imagery of luxury fashion and manipulating it in
clever ways that could not be reduced to profit-driven "free-riding" on
another's prestige.
Limiting my examination to goods that transcended "knockoff" status, I
chose a cross-section of Lichtenberg-esque works and tentatively classified
them based on apparent ease of interpretation. In a few instances (where
the visual material consisted mostly of words), I was reasonably confident
that I understood what the shirt was trying to "say":
Figure S: "Dior Not War"23
23 Dior Not War Crew Neck, WHO CARES NYC, http://www.whocaresnyc.com/products/
dior- not-war-crew- neck (last visited Aug. t8, 2014).
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Figure 6: "Poor"24
24 See Poor, ETSY, https://imgo.etsystatic.com/o31/o/7795656/i34ox27o.5634o6452 r6vv.jpg
(last visited Aug. t8, 2014).
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Figure 7: "Envy"25
25 Melanie Andujar, Envy Parody Design Inspired by Fendi, REDBUBBLE, http://www.redbubble.
com/people/melanieandujar/works/to85228-envy-parody-design-inspired-by-fendi?p-t-shirt (last
visited Aug. t8, 2014). This t-shirt evokes the primary logo of the Italian luxury fashion house Fendi:
F
FENDI
For one commentator's view that the public perceives Fendi as "the leading brand for high-quality
products that are stylish, durable, lavish and eye-catching," see Morgan King, Fendi: 7he Definition
of Luxury, VISION ARTISTRY MAGAZINE (May 30, 2o11), http://visionaryartistrymag.com/2o11/
o5/fendi-the-definition-of-luxury/.
20 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online
Figure 8: "LW Label Whore"26
Other works in my sample did not lend themselves to a single obvious
interpretation (though outside sources might shed light on the context or
purpose of these items) 27 :
26 Dentzdesigndeals, Label Whore - Louis Vuitton Parody - Black Tshirt - Women and Mens Clothing,
WANELO, http://wanelo.cOm/p/2780238/abe-whore-louis-vuitton-parody-black-tshirt-women-
and-mens-clothing (last visited Aug. t8, 2014 ).This t-shirt evokes the logo of the well-known
fashion house Louis Vuitton:
LOUIS VUITTON
File: Louis Vuitton Logo, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (Mar. 6, 2011), http://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Louis Vuitton Logo.svg.
27 My research revealed, for example, that the shirt in Figure 9 was inspired by the work of
street artist Christophe Schwarz, or "Zevs," whose "dripping" technique originated in his
campaign to metaphorically bloody fashion billboards. As a result, "the viewer is forced to
consider the image in an entirely different way." Erin Wooters, Street Artist Zevs Detained in Hong
[Vol. 163: 11
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Figure 9: Dripping Chanel Logo 28
Kongfor Defacing Chanel Logo - Interview, ART RADAR ASIA (July 29, 2009), http://artradarjournal.
com/2009/07/29/street-artist- zevs -detained-in- hong-kong-for-defacing-chanel-logo -interview.
Zevs explains that he "kept working with the dripping effect throughout [his post-billboard] work
because it conveys multiple meanings, and visually shows stark contrast and beautiful pattern and
texture." Id.
Figure it is the work of a popular designer, Mike Frederiqo, whose website sheds some light
on his artistic objectives. See About Mike Frederiqo, MIKE FREDERIQO, http://www.mikefrederiqo.
com/about-mike-frederiqo (last visited Aug. t8, 2014) (noting the artist's prior work as a tattoo and
graffiti artist, Andy Warhol's influence on Frederiqo's art, and the "acclaim" that Frederiqo has
received for his "redesigned brand logos featuring founders, creative directors and designers
imbued within their logo").
The design depicted in Figure io apparently seeks to participate in a dialogue surrounding
Lichtenberg's Homis shirt; of course, without knowledge of the Lichtenberg shirt (and numerous
derivatives thereof appearing across on the Internet), one cannot properly interpret this new variant.
28 Zevs, Chanel T-Shirt, DE BUCK GALLERY, http://shop.debuckgallery.com/zevs/353-zevs-
chanel-t-shirt.html (last visited Aug t8, 2014). The "drip" design, which can now be found in
countless variations across the Internet, modifies the well-known "interlocking 'C's"' imagery of the
fashion house Chanel:
CHANEL
File: Chanel Logo Interlocking Cs, WIKIPEDIA (Apr. 14, 2012, 4:27 AM), http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/File:Chanel logo interlocking cs.svg.
22 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 163: 11
Figure lo: "Haters Gonna Hate"29
Figure 11: "Tribute to Mrs. Vuitton"30
29 Haters Gonna Hate (Gold Hermes Parody), HUMAN, http://www.lookhuman.com/design/
34379-haters-gonna-hate-gold-hermes -parody (last visited Aug. i8, 2014).
30 Mike Frederiqo, Tribute to Mrs. Vuitton, MIKE FREDERIQO, http://www.mikefrederiqo.com/
tshirts/tribute-to-mrs-vuitton.html (last visited Aug. i8, 2014).
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Still other products, like the Homifs shirt whose ambiguity had first
piqued my curiosity, could potentially be read in a certain way, but at the
now-obvious risk of substituting one's own assumptions and biases for the
creators' intentions:
Figure 12: "Lord Voldemort 31
31 Lord Voldemort, HUMAN, http://www.lookhuman.com/design/o579-lord-voldemort?gclid-
CODRpMjSn8ACFcti7 AodfFcARQ (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
2014]
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Figure 13: "N' 1 Cares at All"'32
32 No 1 Cares, IMNOTADESIGNER.COM, http://imnotadesigner.com/inadshop/index.php?
route-product/product&path-65&product id-187&sort-p.price&order-ASC (last visited Aug.
t8, 2014). This shirt draws on the imagery of Chanel's well-known "No. S" fragrance:
CHANEL, N°5 Eau de parfum Spray, http://www.chanel.com/en US/fragrance-beauty/Fragrance-
N%C2%Bo 5 -N%C2%Bo5 -8818/sku/88184 (last visited Aug. t8, 2014).
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Figure i4: "LV" with Peace Sign33
Figure 15: "Class Cred 34
33 LV Love Victory Peace T-Shirt, GLAMZELLE, http://www.glamzelle.com/products/lv-love-
victory-peace-t-shirt-2-colors-available (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
34 Annakatee, Kill Brand Class Cred White Oversize Scoop Neck Tee Shirt, KABOODLE,
http://www.kaboodle.com/reviews/kill-brand-class-cred-white-oversize-scoop-neck-tee-shirt (last visited
Aug. 18, 2014).
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Despite differences in the legibility of these items, they seemed to share a
particular sensibility: like Lichtenberg's designs, each work appeared to
acknowledge the prestige (or at least the prominent social role) of high-end
fashion, while simultaneously using the imagery of luxury for the creator's
own artistic ends. These works did not engage in a straightforward, unwavering
critique of high-end fashion-indeed, some of the shirts seemed to express a
desire for luxury goods-yet they declined to treat the iconic imagery of
venerable fashion houses as inviolable. Even if luxury items purveyed by
the brands in question might be out of financial reach, that fact apparently
provided no cause for protest in the traditional sense.3" Rather, these works
uniformly expressed attitudes toward, and relationships with, luxury brands
that were far more nuanced than pure loyalty or opposition.
As a result, placing the works in a particular genre proved difficult. The
goods could not accurately be described as "parodies"-at least, not as that
term is used in intellectual-property law.3 6 Their apparently personal and
sincere nature meant that they could not be characterized as blank "pastiche."37
If one were forced to place each item somewhere on a sort of "communicative
spectrum" between empty appropriation of imagery (pastiche) and carefully
targeted, humorous critique (parody), most of these works fell a considerable
distance from each pole.38 Further complicating matters, the ambiguity of
the expression contained in these fashion goods lay in stark contrast to the
35 See, e.g., supra figs.6, 7.
36 The definition of "parody" used in trademark law, discussed at length below, is far narrower
than most traditional definitions of the term, which have included styles and techniques "found in
all kinds of generic contexts and not just in those that are traditionally satiric." Robert Chambers,
Parody: 7he Art that Plays with Art, in 21 STUDIES IN LITERARY CRITICISM AND THEORY 195,
199 (Hans H. Rudnick ed., 2010).
37 See FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE
CAPITALISM 17 (1991) ("Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic
style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it is a neutral practice of
such mimicry, without any of parody's ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid
of laughter and of any conviction that alongside the normal tongue you have momentarily
borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists. Pastiche is thus blank parody ...."). For
several examples of what might be considered "trademark pastiche" in fashion, see Jon Caramanica,
The Return of Logo Culture, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/11/21/fashion/
the-return-of-logo-culture-in-fashion.html.
38 While some of the works could arguably be characterized as "collage," that description was
inappropriate for many of them. Further, the meaning of "collage" and its proper treatment under
the law have been debated so extensively in literary, artistic, and legal circles that trying to apply
that definition here would more likely obscure rather than clarify the issue at hand. See generally
Pierre Joris, On the Seamlessly Nomadic Future of Collage, in CUTTING ACROSS MEDIA:
APPROPRIATION ART, INTERVENTIONIST COLLAGE, AND COPYRIGHT LAW 18S, t85-86
(Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf Kuenzli eds., 2011).
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output of both the mainstream fashion industry and its fiercest detractors
over the past half-century. In order to appreciate exactly how these works
are new, and why they are proliferating at this particular moment, one must
learn a bit about recent fashion history.
B. An Aggressively Abridged History of the Past Half-Century of Fashion
(with Some Theory, for Good Measure)
One would think it obvious that, in order to make pronouncements
about a given cultural phenomenon, one must first understand what that
phenomenon is. Yet when academic commentators have written about
fashion at all, they have most often done so without making any serious
effort to comprehend the subject matter at hand.3 9 Those who carefully
examine fashion, by contrast, typically realize in short order that it is a
"profound and critical ...part of the social life of man .... "40 As Ren6
K6nig has explained, "fashion is not merely a superficial-decorative or
disfiguring-feature of life," but rather "an important regulator and means
of expression within [every] community. '41 Cultural studies scholar Elizabeth
Wilson more recently elaborated: "fashionable dress [in Western cultures] is
socially central, a symbolic system of crucial importance [in which] garments
as objects, so close to our bodies, also articulate the soul. ' 42
Such multidimensional accounts of fashion are almost entirely absent
from (the decidedly sparse) legal scholarship and (the more voluminous, but
often dismissive) case law on the subject in the United States. 43 The prevailing
theory of fashion in both spheres, to the extent the cultural phenomenon is
39 See Tom Wolfe, Introduction to RENE KONIG, A LA MODE: ON THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF FASHION 15, 17 (F. Bradley trans., Seabury Press 1973) (1971) (noting that most academics
have treated fashion as nothing more than "the embroidery of history, if that"). Wolfe goes on to
explain that even "novelists who have dwelled on fashion in [a serious] way have usually been
regarded in their own time as lightweights -'trivial' has been the going word .... [This derision
has even afflicted] those who eventually have been judged to be literary giants of their eras." Id. at
19. The basis for this dismissive attitude is suspect. As I have explained elsewhere, the word
"frivolous" has often appeared in judicial discussions of "fashion" -where the matter under
discussion was "ornamental" material geared primarily toward women-but has not been used
where more "utilitarian" apparel was concerned. See Charles Colman, 'A Female Thing': On Fashion,
Sexism, and the United States Federal Judiciary, 4 VESTOJ 53, 57-58 (2013) (noting how "some judges
continue[] to treat clothing-related cases as unworthy of their time").
40 Wolfe, supra note 39, at 17.
41 Id.
4 2 
ELIZABETH WILSON, ADORNED IN DREAMS: FASHION AND MODERNITY xiii (rev.
ed. 2013); accord FRED DAVIS, FASHION, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY t8 (1992) ("Fashion
manages through symbolic means to resonate exquisitely with the shifting, highly self-referential
collective tensions and moods abroad in the land.").
43 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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theorized at all, has remained largely faithful to a century-old economic
account of fashion as just another form of "conspicuous consumption." That
analysis, typically attributed to Thorstein Veblen,44 reduces fashion to (as
paraphrased by cultural theorist Paul Sweetman) "a specifically modern
phenomenon that acts to express or maintain distinctions between different
social groups in a situation where rigid and inflexible social hierarchies no
longer apply. '4
Veblen's account of fashion is appealingly orderly and seemingly intuitive;
its success is understandable. However, the empirical shortcomings of his
theory have been apparent for decades, and it is now beyond dispute that
Veblen's "'top down' approach to the fashion process" is out of date,
incomplete, or simply wrong.46 As Sweetman explains: "while [Veblen's
approach] may have accurately reflected the workings of the fashion process
up to the 195os or 196os, such a model is no longer appropriate given the
declining influence of haute couture-and the ensuing rise of 'street-style'-
since around that period."47
4 4 See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Dover
Publ'ns 1994) (1899).
45 Paul Sweetman, Shop- Window Dummies? Fashion, the Body, and Emergent Socialities, n BODY
DRESSING 59, 61 (Joanne Entwistle & Elizabeth Wilson eds., 2001).
46 Id. at 62 ("Whilst widely influential, the perspective [most often attributed to Thorstein
Veblen, as articulated in his 1899 book 7he Theory of the Leisure Class has been] roundly criticized
[for, among other things,] its failure to account for or address either the form that fashion takes or
its links to wider social, cultural, and artistic movements." (internal citation omitted)).
Consider one commentator's elaboration on the problematic unidimensionality of Veblen's theory:
Since Thorstein Veblen's 1899 Theory of the Leisure Class, the idea of conspicuous
consumption has dominated historical and sociological analyses of consumer behavior,
and is now a part of our everyday vocabulary. Veblenite theories of consumer behavior
argue that fashion changes are motivated by social emulation, conspicuous consumption,
and invidious distinction- "the stimulus of an invidious comparison which prompts
us to outdo those with whom we are in the habit of classing ourselves." [But] men's
fashion changes from the late seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century
were driven by an increasingly inconspicuous form of consumption, a form of
consumption -equally invidious, to be sure-that balanced class demands for social
distinction with a gender ideology of masculine renunciation. Conspicuous
consumption is merely one social dynamic that motivates fashion change: understanding
the variety of systems of consumer behavior means identifying how social and gender
groups at different historical moments used consumer objects in a number of ways to
define themselves in the midst of political, economic, and social change.
DAVID KUCHTA, THE THREE-PIECE SUIT AND MODERN MASCULINITY: ENGLAND, 155o-
1850 S (2002) (footnotes omitted).
47 Sweetman, supra note 4S, at 62 (internal citation omitted). On rare occasions, legal scholars
have addressed the flaws of Veblen's approach. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and
the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 822 (2010) (noting that while Veblen's 'trickle-
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Indeed, starting in the mid-twentieth century, the "development of
modern fashion opened up an important new space for the liberating
presentation of the private self."48 American consumers became increasingly
aware that fashion "had the power to create political change" through its
function as "a code, a symbolic vocabulary that offers a sub-rational but
instant and very brilliant illumination of the character of individuals and
even entire periods, especially periods of great turmoil." 49 This power was
readily evident to those whose ideologies and/or ethnicities played a central
role in identity formation. The hippies, for example, "adopted a naturalistic,
flowing style, apparently in total opposition to the mainstream styles,"
which "originated in the student counter-culture and student campus
rebellions of the anti-Vietnam war 196os."50
Similarly, many African Americans found that they accrued "opposi-
tional economy" by choosing traditional hairstyles like dreadlocks and the
Afro; this use of fashion expressed a distinct identity, one's relationship to
history, and one's political ideology. Hair was far more than a mere status
symbol or decorative medium; rather, the consciously selected styles were
"cultivated and politically constructed in a particular historical moment as
part of a strategic contestation of white dominance and the cultural power
of whiteness.""1
In other words, by the late 196os, the "top down" model of fashion posited
by Veblen no longer told the whole story (if it continued to tell an accurate
story at all). Suddenly, fashion was "evolving on the street without the
direction of-and often in opposition to-the editors and high-fashion
designers."5 2 But this honeymoon period would not last long. The high-end
fashion industry-and mainstream fashion, more generally-rapidly developed
techniques to remain relevant and profitable in the new cultural landscape.
The do-or-die moment for luxury fashion arguably occurred in 1966,
when designer Yves Saint Laurent (previously at the helm of Christian
down' theory of the fashion process may greatly aid quantitative analysis, it has, as an empirical
matter, long been discredited" due to its failure to "offer a comprehensive explanation of the
modern global fashion process"); see also KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE
KNOCKOFF ECONOMY 39 (2o12) (accepting Veblen's "conspicuous consumption" theory as a
core feature of fashion but supplementing Veblen's account to some degree). Compare Jeremy N.
Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 774-75 (2o12) (accepting Veblen's theory as a basic
premise but arguing against judicial adoption of such reasoning in certain trademark disputes).
48 CHRISTOPHER BREWARD, FASHION t6t (2003).
49 Wolfe, supra note 39, at 17, 19.
50 WILSON, supra note 42, at 192-93.
51 Kobena Mercer, Black Hair/Style Politics, 1987 NEW FORMATIONS 33, 40 (emphasis omitted).
52 KARL ASPELUND, FASHIONING SOCIETY: A HUNDRED YEARS OF HAUTE COUTURE BY
SIX DESIGNERS 162 (2009).
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Dior) took the unprecedented step "of bringing the radical youth styles
[that] had begun to appear[] into haute couture."53 Saint Laurent's brilliant,
if cynical, strategy was to sell expensive clothing inspired by youth, subcultural,
and countercultural styles to moneyed consumers who were in no way
affiliated with the groups that had originated those styles.54
Saint Laurent's appropriation of oppositional styles for wealthy clientele
represented the apparent birth of "[t]he marketing of image, divorced from
its [ideological or subcultural] origin, that we have become so used to in
fashion since the 196os."" Just a few short years after the average American
consumer had discovered fashion's political potency, the mainstream
fashion industry had already begun to strip the visual medium of its
"oppositional economy. '5 6 Dress historian Karl Aspelund explains the
long-term effect of this corporate jiu-jitsu on countercultural and otherwise
"subversive" fashion:
Counterculture cannot survive being picked up by media and marketing
campaigns, and even if it does survive in some form, the media creation
becomes the perceived reality. The media creation stands in for the original,
another creature that lives on as a simulacrum even after the original is
gone .... The universalization of television, as [Jack] Kerouac observed, is
right at the heart of [the] lack of subversiveness in modern-day fashion. If
the image is everywhere, then how can it be nonconformist or revolutionary? 57
Indeed, fast-forward twenty-five years, and "antifashion" had practically
evaporated; fashion was by and large apolitical. 58 As Fred Davis observed in
1992, "[a]mid today's cacophony of acceptable fashions, it is difficult to
register a riveting antifashion message. What is being opposed?" 59
By the turn of the twenty-first century, American society "offer[ed] a
scenario in which the carefully manipulated associations of the fashionable
brand and a keen attention to the vagaries of style [had] transformed the
humble equipment of contemporary living into the ephemeral props of
53 Id. at t6t.
54 See id. at t66 (noting how this strategy created a "total separation of image from meaning").
55 Id.
56 Perhaps surprisingly, this occurred not just with apparel, but with African American hairstyles
as well. See Mercer, supra note 51, at 41 ("Once commercialized in the market-place the Afro lost
its specific signification as a 'black' cultural-political statement. Cut off from its original political
contexts, it became just another fashion: with an Afro wig anyone could wear the style.").
57 ASPELUND, supra note S2, at 167.
5 8 See ANNE HOLLANDER, SEX AND SUITS 29 (1994).
59 DAVIS, supra note 42, at 187.
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ever-changing lifestyle concepts." 60 The infusion of material objects with
psychological and sociological significance was not, of course, a novel means
of selling goods, 61 but the new engineers of image manipulation managed to
perfect the technique by painstakingly studying and harnessing the "mystification"
of objects to achieve maximum profits. 62
The most prominent engineers of this manipulation were multinational
luxury conglomerates like LVMH Mot Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA
(LVMH), Kering (formerly "PPR"), and Richemont. As LVMH chairman
Bernard Arnault has explained, his business model for fashion was not about
fulfilling consumers' own preexisting desires, but rather about creating a
"fantasy" in which consumers could then participate by buying an outfit, a
handbag, a bottle of perfume, or just a tube of lipstick-objects at various
price points that made famed brands available, in some form, to most
consumers in the developed world. 63 Arnault's mission was hardly philanthropic,
of course; his business strategy, eerily reminiscent of 1970s neo-Marxist
commentary on the modern "consumerist society, '64 deliberately coupled this
"fantasy" with social anxiety. As Arnault once candidly acknowledged, "[y]ou
feel as if you must buy [the latest 'must-have' item] . . . or else you won't be
in the moment. You will be left behind."65
Inspiring such anxiety would require guile. Developments in technology,
outsourcing, and other industrial innovations during the twentieth century
had led to the widespread availability of high-quality apparel and cosmetics.
As a result, something besides quality, something besides style-something
that could not easily be reproduced by others at a lower price66 -would have
60 Christopher Breward, Fashion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF
CONSUMPTION 3 (Frank Trentmann ed., 2012), available at Oxford Handbooks Online,
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.
61 Sociologist Richard Sennett's description of the turn of the twentieth century seemed equally
applicable too years later: "Even as they became more uniform, physical goods were endowed in
advertising with human qualities, made to seem tantalizing mysteries which had to be possessed to
be understood." RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN 20 (W.W. Norton & Co.
1992) (1974).
62 Id.; see also DANA THOMAS, DELUXE: HOW LUXURY LOST ITS LUSTER 41-42 (2007)
(describing how modern-day fashion focuses chiefly on what products represent).
63 THOMAS, supra note 62, at 41-42, 54-55.
64 See, e.g., JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 143 (1974) (arguing that mainstream advertisements
convey that the "power to spend money is the power to live" and that "those who lack the power
to spend money [will] become literally faceless").
65 THOMAS, supra note 62, at 41-42.
66 See generally Charles E. Colman, An Overview of Intellectual Property Issues Relevant to the
Fashion Industry, in NAVIGATING FASHION LAW: LEADING LAWYERS ON EXPLORING THE
TRENDS, CASES, AND STRATEGIES OF FASHION LAW *52 (2012), available at 2012 WL 167352.
Economic and legal realities in the United States contribute to this result:
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to be fetishized if consumers were to be made to worry about being "left
behind." The seemingly perfect candidate for the job was the "logo."
A newfound emphasis on logos appeared sensible from both legal and
economic perspectives. The law, especially in the United States, tended to
provide more robust enforcement tools to registrants of trademarks than it
did to creators of original designs. Just as importantly, logos could be
prominently placed on (or all over) a heavily used and relatively affordable
component of the fashion ensemble: the handbag.67 Fashion houses adopting
Arnault's business model would, of course, continue to design apparel and
put on spectacular fashion shows, but mainly to "garner headlines and dress
up ads to sell leather goods." 68 This attention enabled companies to push
handbags-associated with the magic of haute couture, if not truly part of
it-"to the forefront of their offerings." 69 Major fashion houses thereby "shifted
the focus [back, arguably] from what the product is to what it represents. '70
Yet this heavy reliance on the logo was (and is) not without its vulnera-
bilities. To the extent that luxury goods consist primarily of logos evoking
the recycled imagery of largely indistinguishable marketing campaigns,
71
they end up providing consumers with very little of the "fantasy" that
makes fashion appealing in the first place. 72 As Jean Baudrillard explains,
Trademark protection is especially important in the [U.S.] fashion industry, because
most of the products sold by that industry are not independently protectable under
the copyright and patent regimes .... In the absence of copyright or patent protection,
it is generally the case that anyone can duplicate a particular accessory or item of apparel.
What makes this purse or that jacket valuable, then, is often the source of the good rather
than its intrinsic value.
Id. at *25.
67 See THOMAS, supra note 62, at 167-71 ("Handbags are the engine that drives luxury brands today.").
68 Id. at 51.
69 Id. at 169.
70 Id. at 41, 169. Some estimate that Louis Vuitton makes only five percent of its revenue
from apparel. Id. at 51.
71 See Vanessa Friedman, In Fashion Ads, Plenty ofDeja Vu, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.cOm/2014/o8/07/fashion/cara-delevingne-gisele-bundchen-and-edie-campbell-are-
familiar-faces-in-fall-fashion-ads.html? r-o ("For an industry that pays a lot of lip service to
originality and unique points of view, fashion can seem surprisingly lemminglike at times.").
72 Anne Hollander aptly describes this power of fashion:
Western fashion offers a visual way out of the trap of tradition, the prison of unquestioning
wisdom. Fashion allows clothing to create an image of skepticism, of comic possibil-
ity, of different powers and alternative thoughts, of manifold chances, of escape from
fixed meanings and fixed roles. Thus, modern fashion has consistently looked wonder-
ful from a distance, especially to young people seeking change from old ways.
HOLLANDER, supra note S8, at 19-20.
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this scenario presents the consumer "with a mythology at one remove,
which strives to pass off as fantasy what is merely fantasmagoria, to entrap
individuals by way of a rigged symbolics, with the myth of their individual
unconscious, to make them invest it as a consumer function."73
A great number of American consumers have at one time or another
bought into the "rigged symbolics" of the logo, for the post-antifashion
landscape long presented few readily accessible, semiotically rich alterna-
tives to mainstream fashion's prepackaged "fantasy."7 4 In recent years,
however, many individual consumers have come to understand-or have
recaptured a lost understanding of-"the power of fashion ... to transform
the sense of self in far-reaching ways." 5
In the 1960s, fashion's "communicative role in the production of identities"
was largely the province of discrete ideological and ethnic minority
groups.7 6 Over the past decade, however, technological advances in "do-it-
yourself" (DIY) apparel production, increasingly sophisticated web-based
platforms for consumer interaction, and myriad avenues for small-scale
distribution have made self-fashioning tools available to the quintessentially
modern "group of one." This new, personalized cornucopia of wearable
items, whether created by others or designed and produced on one's own,
offers, by its very nature, far richer possibilities for self-expression, identity
formation, and "fantasy" than fashion conglomerates can realistically provide.
To be sure, some consumers continue to "produce" or "transform" their
identities primarily through the "symbolics" of fashion logos. Others appear
to remain comfortable with some participation in the mainstream fashion
system, while avoiding the potentially exhibitionist and corporate character
of the logo.77 A third group, it seems, has decided that the luxury fashion
system, while purporting to offer objects that facilitate personal expression
7 3 JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES 147
(Chris Turner trans., 1998) (1970).
74 Further, as noted above, this prepackaged "luxury" was available to a greater percentage of
the population, at a lower price, than it had ever been. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75 Breward, supra note 6o, at 1.
76 Ruth Holliday, Fashioning the Queer Self, in BODY DRESSING 215, 217 (Joanne Entwistle &
Elizabeth Wilson eds., 2001).
77 This second group of consumers has reportedly abandoned prominent logos in favor of
more subtle identity indicators. Suleman Anaya, Has Logo Fatigue Reached a Tipping Point?,
BUSINESS OF FASHION (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.businessoffashion.com/213/o3/has-logo-fatigue-
reached-a-tipping-point.html ("[L]ogo fatigue [has grown] pervasive enough in the West to power
the rise of 'stealth luxury' brands like Bottega Veneta, which, over the last decade, grew from a
small, family-run enterprise to a global powerhouse driving over $1 billion-plus sales."). For a
critique of the legal strategies Bottega Veneta has used in support of this business model, see
Charles Colman, The TTAB's Dangerous Dismissal of 'Doubt,' HARV. J.L. & TECH. DIG. (Nov. 12,
2013), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/trademark/the-ttabs-dangerous-dismissal-of-doubt.
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and fulfill fantasies, can never truly "awaken anything 'deep within us'-
not only because goods bearing that system's brands "don't offend against
anything" (true since the fall of antifashion), but also because the "metalanguage
of connotations" offered by such fashion is simply inadequate to express the
breadth of human emotions and identities.78
C. Today's "Consumer- Creator" Neither Unwavering
Acolyte nor Vocal Dissident
Fortunately for this third group of consumers, defined by a desire for
diverse means of visual self-expression outside of the mainstream fashion
system, the technological and other innovations mentioned above provide
an increasingly viable "opt-out" mechanism.7 9 It is crucial to recognize that
this development represents a fundamental change in the fashion producer-
consumer relationship; mutual dependence is no longer a given. This uncou-
pling coincides with the rise of the consumer-creator, who uses these newly
available tools to realize his own vision of fashion by creating works that
"speak" to him-and, when worn or otherwise displayed, "speak" to others on
his behalf.80
78 BAUDRILLARD, supra note 73, at 148. Naturally, there is overlap and movement among
these groups; further, I do not claim that such categories are exhaustive, even among the general
population or subpopulations within the United States. Rather, I employ this three-tiered
framework mainly as a heuristic for conceptualizing the broad, if piecemeal, cultural migration
toward the "consumer-creator" role discussed in Section I.C-a role that ultimately yields the
fashion items under discussion.
79 Indeed, these technologies are evolving at a pace that excites the public and alarms corporate
America. Nearly every week, it seems, a different law firm posts a bulletin about the surprisingly
rapid development of "3D printing" and other DIY technologies -and it would be naive to think
corporate concerns relate only to counterfeiting. See, e.g., Hayden Delaney, Game of Thrones, 3 D
Printers & Copyright, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-
3aooo339-c453- 4 osd-8d13-f 7e2d21fc9 6o (discussing the "perfect storm of cheaper 3 D printing
devices which are becoming increasingly available to end consumers [who are] finding innovative
ways to put these devices to . . . use," and noting that corporations might have to "look at other
legal doctrines to afford [the desired level of] protection where copyright simply won't provide");
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, 3 D Printing and Intellectual Property, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-17494c2-aa4a- 4 of6-8b19 -9 6db41724 cfb (noting that as "[p]rinters
become faster and more reliable, layers of construction become smaller, allowing for more
sophisticated products, [and] the scope of prime materials continues to grow," we start to "see the
first signs of IP holders trying to levy their usual tax on innovation into a new field").
80 While the consumer-creator often makes his products available for sale to others, this does
not-as a matter of common sense or established doctrine-render them less "expressive." See
generally Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3 d 894, 906 (9 th Cir. 2002) (holding that even
if a parody had a commercial purpose, that alone was not enough to make the parody "commercial"
where the commercial purpose was "inextricably entwined with ... expressive elements" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 51o U.S. 569, 574 (1994)
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It makes little sense to call this DIY fashion "countercultural," or even
"oppositional," for-as we have seen in the representative examples depicted
above-its creators do not design these objects for political protest. When
one can quite literally, and quite affordably, create a unique article of
clothing for every day of the week, proclaiming oneself a staunch adversary
of the fashion "establishment" seems childish, heavy-handed-for that
"establishment" is not (at the moment) the enemy, but just another service
provider,"8 another component of one's everyday aesthetic experience.
Today, a given consumer might have an attitude toward high-end fashion
ranging anywhere from strong distaste to relative indifference to unwavering
adulation, but far more nuanced attitudes toward fashion are possible-and,
one imagines, quite likely.
All of this brings us back to Brian Lichtenberg, the creator of the Homi&s
t-shirt, and his fellow consumer-creators whose works appear above. These
designers use the trademarks and other marketing imagery of high-end
fashion houses in their own works for expressive ends-even if their
expression is not necessarily "legible" to others.82 But while a specific
message (if it makes sense to speak of one at all) might be difficult to discern,
these DIY goods' design and production indisputably create a means for
individuals to exercise agency by taking the "carefully manipulated" 3 brand
imagery of aspiring corporate tastemakers and manipulating it once again to
visually convey one's idiosyncratic feelings about luxury and/or fashion.
(rejecting the Sixth Circuit's view that a "commercial" purpose renders a parody or other work
"presumptively unfair" in fair-use analysis). Non-creator consumers will naturally gravitate toward
products from consumer-creators with similar sensibilities. In this Essay, I do not dwell on this
distinction; instead, I focus mainly on the creator-consumers, because (t) they are the most likely
targets of lawsuits brought by trademark owners, (2) it is their direct creativity and expression at
issue in such lawsuits, and (3) an examination of non-creator consumers' motivations for buying and
wearing the items in question would present interpretive difficulties surpassing even those relating
to the creator-consumer. See COLIN CAMPBELL, The Meaning of Objects and the Meaning of Actions,
I JOURNAL OF MATERIAL CULTURE 93, 95 (1996) ("Just because observers [might] find it
relatively easy to ascribe meanings to products it should not be assumed that these correspond to
those meanings that inform the actions of individuals when making use of those products.").
81 See THOMAS, supra note 62, at 54 (discussing the current omnipresence of luxury brands
once off-limits to "the masses").
82 This should not surprise us. As Umberto Eco explains,
Obviously fashion codes are less articulate ... than linguistic codes are. But a code is
no less a code for the fact that it is weaker than other stronger ones .... The fact is
that communication neither has to do with verbal behaviour alone, nor involves our
bodily performances alone; communication encompasses the whole of culture.
Umberto Eco, Social Life as a Sign System, in STRUCTURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION 57, 59
(David Robey ed., 1979) (1973).
83 See supra note 6o and accompanying text.
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No doubt some fashion companies will object to the designs in question,
claiming that consumer-creators could draw on a virtually unlimited amount
of visual material without using "their property." (As noted in Part II,
plaintiffs often trot out this argument in litigation over defendants' use of
third-party trademarks for creative ends.) From an equitable standpoint,
however, these companies would seem to be poorly positioned to lodge such
complaints. As Jessica Litman has lucidly explained, active consumer
engagement with the rich symbology of trademarks is the natural result of
brands' omnipresent "lifestyle marketing":
[I]t is not surprising that speakers and writers are drawn to those devices
that are, by dint of heavy advertising, doubtlessly universally familiar.
"Mickey Mouse," "Twinkies," "Star Wars," and "Spam" are trade symbols,
but they are also now metaphors with meanings their proprietors would not
have chosen. They got that way in spite of any advertising campaigns because
the general public invested them with meaning. The value of persuasive trade
symbols, in short, results from mutual investment by producers and consumers. 84
It is equally unsurprising that consumer-creators' DIY reflections on
luxury-fashion trademarks will often strike others as ambiguous. 8 For each
person's relationship with "luxury fashion"-and all that it might represent-
will differ, and imagery expressing one's experience or emotions, like
fashion itself, rarely speaks with the precision of language. 86 Indeed, when it
comes to the DIY works under discussion, "clarity of message" is, at best,
tangential-and, at worst, counterproductive-to the main objective of the
endeavor.87 Thus, as discussed below, to scrutinize such fashion for a
84 Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: 7he Public Interest in the Advertising Age, to8 YALE
L.J. 1717, 1732-33 (1999) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).
85 Some scholars have thoughtfully examined ambiguity in trademark law from the perspective
of consumers. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive
Values: How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 261, 286 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D.
Janis eds., 2008). Here, I focus specifically on the ambiguity at issue in consumer-creators'
affirmative use of marks.
86 As Fred Davis once put it, "while clothing may say something, it is scarcely involved in
conversation." DAVIS, supra note 42, at 7-8 n.5; see also id. at 13 ("[W]hat most distinguishes
clothing as a mode of communication from speech . . . is that meaningful differences among
clothing signifiers are not nearly as sharply drawn and standardized as are the spoken sounds
employed in a speech community."). Of course, DIY fashion might feature a few words, as do
some post-parodies presented here, but that remains a long way off from conversation.
87 See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FOR A CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
SIGN 78-79 (Charles Levin trans., q8i) ("Fashion is one of the more inexplicable phenomena ....
[I]ts compulsion to innovate signs, its apparently arbitrary and perpetual production of meaning-
a kind of meaning drive-and the logical mystery of its cycle are all in fact of the essence .... ).
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"message" in the traditional, linguistic (and, specifically, political) sense of
the word is to misconstrue the medium in question and thereby undervalue
its more abstract, but crucial, "role in the production of identities.""8
In short, I contend that Brian Lichtenberg's designs, which he describes
as simultaneously "reverential" and "autonomous,"8 9 are emblematic of an
emerging sensibility-one that is precisely what we might expect of
consumer-creators living in an Internet age and a DIY technology-equipped
world, where the products of famous brands are powerful, 90 but increasingly
outnumbered, vehicles for "presenting oneself" to society through appearance
(a central component of which is one's preferred apparel). This emerging
fashion sensibility cannot be understood under the traditional-or, as I will
consider in Part II, legal-rubric of opposition-or-allegiance. The works in
question neither swear off luxury fashion nor wholeheartedly embrace its
allure; instead, they seem to give visual form to the complex attitudes that
naturally arise toward something both "exclusive" and ubiquitous, venerable yet
chameleonic, culturally charged yet semiotically contingent on each individual's
reaction to it. 91
One might initially be inclined to describe these DIY fashions as "parodies"
of luxury brands and their products (with the attendant consequences of
that classification, as discussed in Part II). But the term "parody" utterly
fails to capture the complex social, psychological, and aesthetic factors
shaping these goods. The apparel pictured above strongly suggests that,
unlike traditional parodists, the consumer-creators under discussion do not
wish to convey a single, or even readily articulable, message. Works of this
sort are much more likely to convey contradictory impulses and emotions
88 Holliday, supra note 76, at 217; see also Eco, supra note 82, at 59 ("I am speaking through
my clothes.").
89 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
90 As Professor Dreyfuss has noted, "those who decide to give their marks dominance should
be deemed to accept the risk that their marks will be used for expressive [ends]." Dreyfuss, supra
note 8S, at 289.
911 cannot, of course, definitively prove that this sensibility represents a sea change; such
changes can only be empirically confirmed after the fact. See JAMESON, supra note 37, at xix
("[P]eople become aware of the dynamics of some new system, in which they are themselves
seized, only later on and gradually."). With that said, the DIY items under discussion arguably
challenge Ren6 K6nig's observation about individuals' attitudes toward fashion in the early 1970s:
To some, fashion is a manifestation of evil, it represents everything that is damnable.
To others it opens up, with all its new developments, new horizons, enriches and
diversifies life and makes it more attractive .... These two opinions allow of no
transitions, no compromise; there are no possibilities of conciliation, only extreme
and one-sided value judgments.
KONIG, supra note 39, at 29.
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that elude facile dichotomies, like criticism-adulation and humor-sobriety,
on which the traditional legal conception of "parody" is premised.
No, the unifying sentiment of the DIY fashion examined above is not
humor, not critique, but ambivalence.92 These consumer-creators' works are a
means by which individuals can "inscribe[] upon [their] bodies the often
obscure relationship of art, personal psychology and the social order."93 If
one must decide on a single name for this category of works, (somewhat
reluctantly) taking as a starting point the lexicon of trademark law-for it is
primarily trademark law that will decide the fate of these goods-the
products of Lichtenberg and like-minded designers might be best labeled
"post-parodies." The generality of this term is perhaps its primary virtue,
for among the few characteristics common to these works is a shared
sensibility that both post-dates, and reflects psychological dynamics far
more complex than, those found in traditional parodies.
II. TRADEMARK LAW'S "PARODY" DOCTRINE
AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
A. An Introduction to a Willfully One-Dimensional Doctrinal Approach
Of course, to call the DIY fashions under discussion "post-parodies"
does not resolve the thorny issue of their appropriate legal treatment. While
multiple areas of law are potentially implicated in the question of post-parodies'
lawfulness, I will focus on the most significant potential obstacle for their
continued creation and existence: federal trademark law.
92 1 use the term "ambivalence" throughout this Essay to mean "uncertainty or fluctuation,
especially when caused by inability to make a choice or by a simultaneous desire to say or do two
opposite or conflicting things," or "the coexistence within an individual of positive and negative
feelings toward the same person, object, or action, simultaneously drawing him or her in opposite
directions." Ambivalence, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ambivalence
(last visited Aug. t8, 2014). Notably, some literature from the field of psychology attributes
significant power to ambivalence:
[At times, ambivalence] confuses, devours, and tortures. But it also defines and orders,
transforming the unknown into a knowable opposite. It constructively metaphors
the world. Ambivalence may appear as competing sides of an image or as a result of
the contest between to fantasies .... A structural feature of every image and fantasy,
ambivalence belongs to symptom, symbol, and context. Unmediated, the ambivalent
fusion of opposites devours [the] soul. Mediated by recognition and acceptance, it is
therapeutic, imaginative, originating and joining.
Mark Garrison, 7he Poetics of Ambivalence, 1982 SPRING: ANN. ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOL. &
JUNGIAN THOUGHT 213, 229.
93 WILSON, supra note 42, at 247.
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The foundation of federal trademark law is the Lanham Act, whose
somewhat skeletal provisions have been fleshed out by numerous judicial
decisions. The most important language of the Lanham Act, for present
purposes, is the following:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device . .. [that] is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who ... is likely to be damaged by such act. 94
In order to help judges and juries determine whether a defendant's actions
have caused a "likelihood of confusion," each federal circuit has developed a
multifactor framework that guides the infringement inquiry. These tests are
not exclusively (or even primarily) concerned with the question of whether
any actual confusion has occurred. Rather, the multifactor tests purport to
evaluate "whether, if a defendant is permitted to continue [his conduct], an
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are 'likely to be
confused' about the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the goods or
services at issue. 95
Even with the guidance of specified factors, infringement is a more
complex inquiry than it might initially appear. For one thing, a tension
arguably exists between the trademark holder's interest in controlling the
mark's use and the public's interest in using the mark for critical, expressive,
creative, comparative, and other purposes. 96 In diverse areas of law where
94 IS U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). A separate statutory provision creates a
cause of action for registered marks, but its differences from the cited provision are not material to
the present discussion. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000)
(giving substantially similar treatment to the provisions concerning registered and unregistered
material); see also id. at 210 ("The text of [§ 1125(a)] provides little guidance as to the circumstances
under which unregistered [material] may be protected.").
95 Colman, supra note 66, at *26. But see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor
Tests for Trademark Infringement, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2oo6) (arguing that a statistical analysis
reveals that judges place much greater weight on some factors than others, and tend to "stampede"
remaining factors in order to reach their desired outcome).
96 It is by no means obvious that post-parodists' interests are necessarily in tension with those
of trademark owners; even courts sometimes rely on the argument that "parodies only increase
fame" to bolster their rulings. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC,
S07 F.3d 2S2, 267 (4 th Cir. 2007) ("Indeed, by making the famous mark an object of the parody, a
successful parody might actually enhance the famous mark's distinctiveness by making it an icon.
The brunt of the joke becomes yet more famous."); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.
2d 1482, 1489-9o (0oth Cir. 1987) ("[B]ecause of the parody aspect of Lardashe, it is not likely that
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disputes arise due to a perceived conflict between a private right or public
good and the right to free expression, judges engage in fact-specific balanc-
ing of the interests at stake. 97 However, the closest federal trademark
jurisprudence comes to such policy-based balancing is a doctrine applied to
"artistic" works making use of others' trademarks, first announced in the
1989 case of Rogers v. Grimaldi.98
Under the Rogers test, the Lanham Act
will not be applied to expressive works "unless the [use of the trademark or
other identifying material] has no artistic relevance to the underlying work
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the [use of trademark
or other identifying material] explicitly misleads as to the source or the
content of the work."99
In the quarter-century of its existence, the Rogers test has often been used to
adjudicate the lawfulness of traditional trademark "parodies."100 However,
the doctrine's applicability remains limited to "expressive works," as
idiosyncratically defined by the courts.101 This limitation means the Rogers
public identification of JORDACHE with the plaintiff will be eroded; indeed, parody tends to
increase public identification of a plaintiff's mark with the plaintiff."). For the sake of argument, I
will assume the existence of a conflict between the interests of a trademark owner and a post-parodist
using the owner's mark in his work.
97 See, e.g., David A. Simon, 7he Confusion Trap: Rethinking Parody in Trademark Law, 88
WASH. L. REV. 1021, 1034 (2013) ("First Amendment jurisprudence often resorts to ad hoc
balancing, weighing various interests against each other.").
98 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[I]n general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to
apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs
the public interest in free expression."); see also Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3 d 1235, 1242 (9 th
Cir. 2013) ("The only relevant legal framework for balancing the public's right to be free from
consumer confusion ... and [the defendant's] First Amendment rights in the context of [a
Lanham Act] claim is the Rogers test.").
99 Brown, 724 F.3 d at 1239 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
100 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473,
481 (2013) (observing that "recent parody decisions reflect a trend toward the Rogers standard").
101 Brown explains this limitation and applies it in the video game context:
The Rogers test is reserved for expressive works. Even if Madden NFL is not the expressive
equal of Anna Karenina or Citizen Kane, the Supreme Court has answered with an
emphatic "yes" when faced with the question of whether video games deserve the
same protection as more traditional forms of expression .... [V]ideo games communicate
ideas-and even social messages -through many familiar literary devices.... Interaction
between the virtual world of the game and individuals playing the game is prevalent.
Even if there is a line to be drawn between expressive video games and non-expressive
video games, and even if courts should at some point be drawing that line, we have
no need to draw that line here.
724 F.3d at 1241.
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doctrine will not necessarily-and in fact, probably will not1 2-come into
play in cases involving allegedly (post-)parodic apparel.103
Far more likely to govern the outcome of litigation over apparel of the
sort examined above, which makes use of others' logos for (at least partially)
expressive or creative ends, is trademark law's "parody" doctrine. That
doctrine-unlike the Rogers test-does not prescribe any policy-based
balancing of the parties' interests or assessment of the constitutional
considerations implicated in a particular dispute.10 4 Instead, the black-letter
law governing "non-artistic" trademark parodies is almost willfully
simplistic, hewing closely to (or, arguably, hiding behind) the principle that
deceptive or misleading speech is simply not entitled to protection under
the First Amendment.1 0 5
Because the traditional test for trademark infringement is whether a
defendant's goods or services are "likely to confuse" consumers as to source
or affiliation, federal courts often parrot the maxim that disputes over
trademark parodies require no analysis at all beyond the usual multifactor
test for trademark infringement. 106 Put differently, either a trademark
parody is likely to confuse (and thus infringing in nature) or not (and thus
non-infringing):
"Some parodies will constitute an infringement, some will not. But the cry
of 'parody!' does not magically fend off otherwise legitimate claims of
trademark infringement .... There are confusing parodies and non-confusing
parodies. All they have in common is an attempt at humor through the use
102 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 97, at 1027 (discussing how most courts do not use the Rogers
standard in parody cases, but asserting that it provides the "most promising approach").
103 See Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 8o6, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Rogers,
875 F.2d at 998) (refusing to apply Rogers to the defendant's "placement of his [allegedly parodic]
bar-and-shield logo on his newsletter and T-shirts"). Cf. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art,
Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (tith Cir. 2o12) (finding the defendant's "paintings, prints, and calendars"
to be insulated from infringement claims as a matter of law, while holding that Rogers' applicability
to the defendant's "mini-prints, mugs, cups, . . .flags, towels, t-shirts, [and] other mundane
products" presented "disputed issues of material fact").
104 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, S8 S.C. L.
REV. 737, 748 (2007) ("The deeper conflict between trademark law and the modern First
Amendment is that information is rarely completely helpful or completely misleading. The idea
that prohibitions on fraud improve the information environment depends on truth and falsity
being pure binaries. Many trademark (and false advertising) cases, however, are more complicated.").
105 Id. at 746 (noting the Supreme Court's view that "trademark laws that regulat[e] confusing
uses of marks are constitutional because the government may regulate 'deceptive or misleading'
commercial speech" (internal quotations and footnote omitted)).
106 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., tog F.3d 1394, 140S (9th
Cir. 1997) ("[T]he claim of parody is not really a separate 'defense' as such, but merely a way of
phrasing the traditional response that customers are not likely to be confused as to the source,
sponsorship or approval.").
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of someone else's trademark. A non-infringing parody is merely amusing,
not confusing." 10 7
Another potential concern for parodists and post-parodists is the rise of
trademark dilution claims, for which Congress created a federal cause of
action in 1996 (as overhauled in 2006).108 To win a trademark dilution case,
a trademark owner-plaintiff need not prove "likelihood of confusion."
Instead, he must show a "likelihood of dilution," which can arise where a
defendant's conduct creates an "association arising from the similarity
between a mark and a trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the [plaintiff's] famous mark." 10 9 While the Lanham Act's
dilution provisions do provide a safe harbor for specified "fair uses" that
might include certain parodies,110 the uncertain scope of this immunity 1
keeps potential dilution liability very much in play for parodic goods.112
107 id. (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 31.38 (rev. ed. 1995)).
108 The Ninth Circuit explained the relevant legislative and doctrinal developments in Levi
Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.:
[In 2003,] the Supreme Court handed down a decision that greatly impacted many
courts of appeals' interpretations of the [Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA)].
In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), the Court held ... that the
text of the FTDA "unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than
a likelihood of dilution.". . . However, this requirement of actual dilution was not
long-lived. In 2oo6, largely in response to the Moseley decision, Congress enacted
the [Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA)]. In doing so, Congress did not
simply alter the language on which the Court in Moseley had relied; instead, Congress
replaced the FTDA with a more detailed statute. The TDRA did provide relief for
"likely," as opposed to actual, dilution. iS U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). However, it also explicitly
provided relief for dilution "by blurring" or by "tarnishment," id., and defined both
types of dilution, id. § 1125(c)(2)(ii).
633 F.3 d tt58, ii65-66 (9 th Cir. 2011).
109 Id. at 1171 (quoting i5 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012)).
110 IS U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (creating a defense to federal trademark-dilution liability for
"[a]ny fair use ... of a famous mark by another person .... including use in connection with ...
identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner").
n1 See Simon, supra note 97, at iosi (noting that, while the Lanham Act "exempts parody (and
criticism and commentary) as fair use when the parodic use is not done as a mark[,] it says nothing
about parodic uses that are source identifying"); see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note too, at 504-12
(highlighting doctrinal uncertainties).
112 See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note too, at 483 (noting that some courts disfavor "fair
use" parody claims because of "a general aversion to free riding"). The skepticism noted by Dogan
and Lemley is evident in the language of judicial decisions like Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.:
Sellers of commercial products who wish to attract attention to their commercials or
products and thereby increase sales by poking fun at widely recognized marks of
noncompeting products ... risk diluting the selling power of the mark that is made
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In short, when speaking of trademark law's "parody" jurisprudence, the
doctrinal analysis is theoretically bifurcated. Yet the central problems, from
the post-parodist's perspective, are largely the same, no matter the cause of
action. First, trademark law's definition of permissible "parodies" has grown
narrower, more formalistic, and less reflective in recent decades. Second,
that definition of "parody" is essentially incompatible with the creative
expression that defines the post-parodic sensibility.
B. Some Early, Thoughtful Judicial Engagement with Trademark Parodies and
the Progressively Less Thoughtful Jurisprudence that Followed
In a few early appellate-court decisions involving traditional trademark
parodies, judges engaged thoughtfully with the genre. In L.L. Bean v. Drake
Publishers, for instance, the First Circuit undertook a somewhat ambitious
treatment of trademark parodies in an appeal concerning a two-page adult-
magazine spread entitled "L.L. Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog. '""I
The defendant in that case had drawn the ire of apparel and consumer-goods
company L.L. Bean by "display[ing] a facsimile of Bean's trademark and
featured pictures of nude models in sexually explicit positions using 'products'
that were described in a crudely humorous fashion."114
The panel majority began by observing that "[p]arody is a humorous
form of social commentary and literary criticism that dates back as far as
Greek antiquity." ''1 The First Circuit then reminded the litigants that,
despite recent rhetoric describing trademarks as a form of "property,"
"[t]rademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use
of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of
view"; indeed, such "unauthorized uses" might be necessary to effectively
comment on contemporary American culture:
One need only open a magazine or turn on television to witness the pervasive
influence of trademarks in advertising and commerce. Designer labels appear
on goods ranging from handbags to chocolates to every possible form of
clothing. Commercial advertising slogans, which can be registered as
fun of. When this occurs, not for worthy purposes of expression, but simply to sell
products, that purpose can easily be achieved in other ways. The potentially diluting
effect is even less deserving of protection when the object of the joke is the mark of a
directly competing product.
4V F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). In Section II.C, I question the
federal courts' purported capacity to evaluate the "worthiness" of allegedly dilutive expression.
113 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 81t F.2d 26, 27-34 (Ist Cir. 1987).
114 Id. at 27.
115 Id. at 28.
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trademarks, have become part of national political campaigns. "Thus,
trademarks have become a natural target of satirists who seek to comment
on this integral part of the national culture. 116
Although the district court had found "trademark dilution" in the possi-
bility that the defendant's spoof might "tarnish" L.L. Bean's "wholesome"
brand with "images of impurity," 117 the First Circuit cautioned that
"[n]either the strictures of the first amendment nor the history and theory
of anti-dilution law permit a finding of [dilution by] tarnishment based
solely on the presence of an unwholesome or negative context in which a
trademark is used without authorization." ' 8 The First Circuit, seemingly
cognizant of potential overreaching by plaintiffs once trademark rights are
untethered from the notion of confusion, laid down a bright-line rule: "The
Constitution does not . . . permit the range of the anti-dilution statute to
encompass the unauthorized use of a trademark in a noncommercial setting
such as an editorial or artistic context.
11 9
The court then addressed the significance of the parodic nature of
defendant's work, explaining that its "reluctance to apply the anti-dilution
116 Id. at 28-29 (quoting Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel,
Trademark and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 6S B.U. L. REV. 923, 939 (1985)).
117 1d. at 27, 30-31. Presumably because even the most unsophisticated readers of the "L.L.
Beam Back-To- School- Sex- Catalog" would not be "likely to confuse" the satirical spread as being
associated with the staid apparel and outdoor-goods company whose ubiquitous catalogs it
spoofed, L.L. Bean's lawsuit hinged not on trademark infringement but rather on trademark
dilution under Maine's anti-dilution statute. (The federal Lanham Act did not yet include an
anti-dilution provision.)
The First Circuit supplied its understanding of anti-dilution statutes' purpose:
Anti-dilution statutes have developed to fill a void left by the failure of trademark
infringement law to curb the unauthorized use of marks where there is no likelihood
of confusion between the original use and the infringing use. The law of trademark
dilution aims to protect the distinctive quality of a trademark from deterioration
caused by its use on dissimilar products.
Id. at 3o.
118 Id. at 31.
119 Id. at 33. Chief Judge Campbell, dissenting, would have declined to rule at that stage of
the litigation; he instead favored certifying key issues for consideration by the Maine Supreme
Court, which would, in his words, "permit the state court to decide whether or not a pornographic
parody of this type constitutes trademark dilution under the Maine statute." Id. at 35 (Campbell,
C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Campbell would have taken this approach despite recognizing that
"[t]he Maine Supreme Judicial Court has expressed an unwillingness, as a matter of policy, to
accept a certified question that will not be dispositive of a federal case." Id. Arguably, Chief Judge
Campbell's dissent was emblematic of a broader judicial discomfort with parodies. As David
Simon writes, "[t]he issue of what constitutes a parody in trademark law, and what legal effect that
finding should have, has been confusing courts for decades." Simon, supra note 97, at 1024.
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statute to the instant case also stems from a recognition of the vital importance
of parody," a medium "deserving of substantial freedom-both as entertainment
and as a form of social and literary criticism."1 20 The court elaborated on the
genre's importance to a free society:
Trademark parodies, even when offensive, do convey a message. The message
may be simply that business and product images need not always be taken
too seriously; a trademark parody reminds us that we are free to laugh at
the images and associations linked with the mark. The message also may be
a simple form of entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent
representation of the trademark with the idealized image created by the
mark's owner .... While such a message lacks explicit political content, that
is no reason to afford it less protection under the first amendment ...
Denying parodists the opportunity to poke fun at symbols and names which
have become woven into the fabric of our daily life, would constitute a serious
curtailment of a protected form of expression. 121
In the decades since L.L. Bean, however, courts seem to have grown less
contemplative of parody's social value.122 Most courts now require that
trademark parodists, in order to avoid a finding of infringement, demonstrate
that they have "not only differentiate[d] the alleged parody from the
original but . . . also communicate[d] some articulable element of satire,
ridicule, joking, or amusement."12 Further, the federal appellate courts have
reached a general consensus that trademark "'parody' is defined as a simple
120 L.L. Bean, 81t F.2d at 33 (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publ'ns, 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964)).
121 Id. at 34.
122 The reasons for this change are numerous, but the most direct cause is likely an intervening
Supreme Court decision, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 51o U.S. S69, 58o-81 (1994), which
prompted lower courts to draw a questionable distinction between non-infringing "parodies"
(works that mock the intellectual property owner-plaintiff, specifically) and infringing "satires"
(works that use a plaintiff's intellectual property for commentary that is not plaintiff-specific). See
Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits
Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 979 (2004) ("One of Campbell's most significant-and
unsatisfying -effects has been to elevate parody . . . and devalue satire. Several courts have since
explicitly relied on the distinction . . . even though the actual language from the Court's opinion
counsels a more sensitive approach."). The L.L. Bean court had defined "parodies" broadly, but
various courts have read the decision in a revisionist manner, probably to synthesize it with the
post-Campbell parody-versus -satire jurisprudence. See, e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We
Stand, Am. N.Y, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1997) (distinguishing L.L. Bean as a case where
the plaintiff's trademark was "an integral part of the humorous message" and the defendant
"poked fun at the plaintiff, but did not cause consumer confusion").
123 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3 d 252, 260 (4 th Cir.
2007) (emphasis added).
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form of entertainment" intended to serve as a vehicle for ridicule or humor. 124
Even if a would-be parodist meets this standard, he can only avoid in-
fringement and dilution liability if he has "successfully" conveyed "two
simultaneous-and contradictory-messages: that [his work] is the original,
but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody."1 2 If a would-be
parody is "unsuccessful" -however that might be determined by a particular
court in a particular case 126-it will be found infringing or dilutive. 27
C. Under Current Parody Doctrine, Courts Evaluating a (Post-)Parodic Work's
"Success" Will Often Find Themselves Forced Either to Hear What Isn't There
or to Plug Their Ears
The most recent factually analogous appellate decision to any material
resembling the post-parodies depicted in Part I is the Fourth Circuit's 2007
decision in Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog.128 That decision
places in high relief one crucial respect in which trademark law's current
parody doctrine cannot meaningfully evaluate works defined by a post-
parodic sensibility.
In Haute Diggity Dog, the famous (and famously litigious) luxury fashion
house Louis Vuitton filed suit over a dog toy that "loosely resemble[d]
miniature handbags and undisputedly evoke[d Louis Vuitton] handbags of
similar shape, design, and color." 129 The Fourth Circuit panel began by
dutifully reciting the black-letter law of trademark parody-a conglomeration
of the rules quoted in Sections II.A and II.B:
124 Id. (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366
(4 th Cir. 2001)).
125 Id. (quoting Doughney, 263 F.3 d at 366).
126 As the following Section illustrates, determining such "success" is a perilous endeavor;
rare is the judge who acknowledges the danger or futility of such efforts:
Yankee asks this court to engage in literary criticism -judging how successful New
York's expressive message was. It is one thing to reject a First Amendment claim because
the court disbelieves the claim that a communicative message was intended. It is
quite another to reject a First Amendment claim because the court gives low marks
to the success of the literary device. Courts are ill equipped to pass literary judgments.
Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Leval, J.).
127 As noted above, I do not focus extensively on the infringement-dilution distinction in this
Essay because post-parodic goods will likely suffer under both doctrines, for largely the same
reasons. See supra Section II.A.
128 Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260.
129 Id. at 258.
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For trademark purposes, "[a] 'parody' is defined as a simple form of
entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the
trademark with the idealized image created by the mark's owner." . . . "A
parody must convey two simultaneous- and contradictory- messages: that
it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody."...
This second message must not only differentiate the alleged parody from
the original but must also communicate some articulable element of satire,
ridicule, joking, or amusement. 130
The court then explained that "[b]ecause Haute Diggity Dog's arguments
with respect to the [likelihood-of-confusion] factors depend to a great
extent on whether its products and marks are successful parodies," it would
first decide "whether Haute Diggity Dog's products, marks, and trade dress
are indeed successful parodies of [Louis Vuitton]'s marks and trade dress"
before moving on to a traditional analysis of infringement and dilution.
131
Figure 16: Louis Vuitton "Multicolor Monogram" Handbag 132
130 Id. at 260. Louis Vuitton brought various claims, but only the federal trademark and trade-dress
claims, which I will discuss collectively as its "trademark" claims, concern us here.
131 Id. As David Simon explains, this so-called "infusion" framework-in varying forms-
appears in many post-Campbell trademark parody decisions. Simon, supra note 97, at 1033.
132 Multicolor Monogram Cruise HandBag by Louis Vuitton, BAGS BY LOUIS VUITTON, http://
bagsbylouisvuitton.blogspot.cOm/2011/04/multicolor-monogram-cruise-handbag-by.html (last visited
Aug. 18, 2014).
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Figure 17: Haute Diggity Dog's "Chewy Vuiton" Chew Toy133
In a surprisingly brief and entirely citationless analysis, the Fourth
Circuit wrote:
No one can doubt that LVM handbags are the target of the imitation by
Haute Diggity Dog's "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys. At the same time, no one
can doubt also that the "Chewy Vuiton" dog toy is not the "idealized image"
of the mark created by [Louis Vuitton]....
[T]he juxtaposition of the similar and dissimilar-the irreverent representation
and the idealized image of an [Louis Vuitton] handbag- immediately conveys
a joking and amusing parody. The furry little "Chewy Vuiton" imitation, as
something to be chewed by a dog, pokes fun at the elegance and expensive-
ness of a LOUIS VUITTON handbag, which must not be chewed by a dog.
The [Louis Vuitton] handbag is provided for the most elegant and well-to-do
celebrity, to proudly display to the public and the press, whereas the imitation
"Chewy Vuiton" "handbag" is designed to mock the celebrity and be used
by a dog. The dog toy irreverently presents haute couture as an object for
casual canine destruction. The satire is unmistakable. The dog toy is a
133 Does 7his Chinese Cabbie Love Louis Vuitton? Or Hate 7hem?, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY
(Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.theknockoffeconomy.com/does-this-chinese-cabbie-love-louis-vuitton-or-
hate-them.
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comment on the rich and famous, on the LOUIS VUITTON name and
related marks, and on conspicuous consumption in general.1 34
Thus, the following points proved dispositive for the defendant: (1) that
its parody succeeds, in part, because an actual Louis Vuitton bag "must not
be chewed by a dog [and yet the parody] presents haute couture as an object
for casual canine destruction"; (2) that its dog toy was "irreverent" in
nature; (3) that the defendant's product "immediately" conveys its parodic,
and thus "amusing," character; and (4) that the product "is a comment on
the rich and famous, on the LOUIS VUITTON name and related marks,
and on conspicuous consumption in general. 1 35
Having checked off these boxes, the Fourth Circuit panel confidently
concluded that the criteria for a "successful parody" were "amply satisfied in
this case," with "the 'Chewy Vuiton' dog toys [having conveyed] 'just
enough of the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate the point
of parody,' but stop[ping] well short of appropriating the entire marks." 136
The court nevertheless continued its discussion, purporting to apply the
likelihood-of-confusion factors but doing so in an unabashedly outcome-
driven manner that served solely to undergird the "parody" determination
already made. 137
Problematically, the court's core analysis (excerpted above) glosses over
several important issues. The panel neglected to specify, for example,
whether its characterization of the chew toy as "unmistakable satire" was a
factual finding, made as a matter of law based on the record-or something
134 Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3 d at 26o-6t.
135 Id. at 261.
136 Id. The court essentially went through the motions once more in its trademark dilution
"analysis." See id. at 265-67 ("[A]s Haute Diggity Dog's 'Chewy Vuiton' marks are a successful
parody, we conclude that they will not blur the distinctiveness of the famous mark .... ).
The court's dilution discussion is notable, however, for the panel's unequivocal assertion-
assumption, even-that the defendant's dog toy was ineligible for the Lanham Act's parody "fair
use" defense due to the "defendant's use of [its] parody as a mark." Id. at 267. With little analysis,
the court characterized the defendant's use of Louis Vuitton's trademarks and trade dress as "a
designation of source for the [defendant's] own goods or services," which deprived the defendant of
immunity from dilution liability. Id. at 266 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2012)). This lax
analysis is perhaps unsurprising, given the continued uncertainty surrounding the notion of
'trademark use," but it nevertheless provides potential cause for concern among parodists and
post-parodists alike.
137 See id. at 267. ("[B]ecause the famous mark is particularly strong and distinctive, it becomes
more likely that a parody will not impair the distinctiveness of the mark."). After engaging in this
arguably circular reasoning, the panel did go on to point out that the outcome might have differed
if the defendant had used plaintiff's actual mark rather than "adopt[ing] imperfectly the items of
[Louis Vuitton]'s designs." Id. at 268.
As for the plaintiff's copyright claim, the court treated it as an afterthought, disposing of it in
a single paragraph at the end of its opinion. See id. at 269-70.
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more akin to judicial notice, and thus necessarily contingent on the presid-
ing judges' background knowledge, assumptions, perceptive capabilities, and
even senses of humor. The panel likewise declined to explain whether its
determinations concerning this "unmistakable satire" and defendant's social
"commentary" were driven primarily or exclusively by (1) the parodist's
actual intent; (2) the parodist's apparent intent, as perceived by the defend-
ant's (or, alternatively, Louis Vuitton's) target audience; (3) the parodist's
apparent intent, as perceived by an "ordinary" and "reasonable" consumer;
or (d) the actual effect on consumers-decided as a matter of law-without
regard for the parodist's subjective intent. These ambiguities are notable
because (1) they suggest an insufficiently nuanced analysis of communicative
dynamics in the parodic context (if not in trademark disputes, more generally),
and (2) they mirror issues likely to arise if (or, rather, when) a post-parody
becomes the subject of litigation.
Perhaps the Fourth Circuit panel simply did not consider these potentially
troublesome details. It may be unseemly to fault those trained primarily in
law for failing to take account of the basic principle of linguistics that
"[c]ommonly a speaker cannot explicate with precision what he meant to get
across, and on these occasions if hearers think they know precisely, they will
likely be at least a little off."' 38 Nevertheless, where presiding courts make
such assumptions-consciously or not-they slight both the parties to
litigation and the members of the public for whom that litigation may well
determine substantive rights. The fault in such instances lies in "a kind of
reductionism [resulting from] claiming to have discovered the one true
interpretation" when there are invariably a "multiplicity of meanings present."13 9
138 ERVING GOFFMAN, FORMS OF TALK to (2d ed. 1983).
139 ROBERT WUTHNOW ET AL., 5 CULTURAL ANALYSIS: THE WORK OF PETER L.
BERGER, MARY DOUGLAS, MICHEL FOUCAULT, AND JURGEN HABERMAS 83 (2oio ed.
2013). Leading theorists have recognized that "there is never just one meaning that can be
conveyed by a system of symbols": while a single 'interpretation' may be insightful for some
purposes," it will always fall short of "the set of rich meanings which are there in the social setting
itself." Id.
To be sure, this rush to interpretation is by no means confined to the judiciary:
[Both social theorists and economists-or rational-strategy theorists -often] presume
that the behaviour of individuals reflects decision-making and choice and it is on this
basis that they proceed to 'interpret' their conduct. The only difference between the
assumptions embodied in the two varieties of social theory is that while the [latter]
presumes that conduct is oriented to the utility of goods, [sociologists] presume that
it is oriented to their symbolic meanings. Typically, however, neither group bother[s]
to verify their assumptions; that is, to check with consumers themselves concerning
the nature and meaning of their actions.
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If, on the other hand, presiding judges' interpretive choices go beyond
inadvertent or deliberate-but-intuitive assumptions-if the Haute Diggity
Dog panel addressed "interpretive uncertainties and discrepancies . . . [by]
exploit[ing them] after the fact to [strategically reconstruct] what the
speaker indeed by and large meant"14 0-then the parties and the public are
hardly any better off. Indeed, when courts, "because of unacknowledged
interests [base their rulings on] pseudo-communication," the result may be a
"systematic distortion" of doctrine that prevents candid engagement with
real "values and facts" and thus fails to resolve conflicting interests in a
transparent and principled manner. 141
In short, it is worrisome to see courts applying trademark law's "unambiguous
message" approach to parodic (and post-parodic) works by pretending to
hear what isn't there. Yet it is equally unsatisfactory for judges to plug their
ears to block out individually and socially valuable expression. The shortcomings
of the latter approach are vividly illustrated in the 2012 decision of Louis
Vuitton v. Hyundai.142 There, a judge in the Southern District of New York
took a different tack from that of the Fourth Circuit when confronted with
a work that incorporated a third-party trademark. Instead of making
subjective interpretive leaps, the district court evaluated the purported
parody's "success" by placing rigid, unwarranted limits on cognizable expression.
The Hyundai case was sparked by yet another complaint by Louis Vuitton,
this time over the alleged infringement and dilution of its "toile monogram"
trade dress. 143 The basis for the fashion house's new lawsuit was a Hyundai
CAMPBELL, supra note 8o, at 96. That said, the phenomenon might well be of greater concern in
the context of the U.S. judiciary, due to the prospective aspect of precedent.
140 GOFFMAN, supra note 138, at 11.
141 WUTHNOW ET AL., supra note 139, at 224 (emphasis omitted).
142 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A., v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. io-t6ti, 2012 WL 1022247
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
143 See Charles Colman, Louis Vuitton Sends Absurd Cease-and-Desist Letter to Penn Law Over
Student Event Flyer (and More Fun with Trademark Abuse!), LAW OF FASHION (Mar. 3, 2012),
http://lawoffashion.com/blog/story/03/03/2012/121:
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commercial aired during the Super Bowl that "included a one-second shot
of a basketball decorated with a distinctive pattern resembling the famous
trademarks of plaintiff Louis Vuitton." 144
Figure i8: Still of Commercial Clip at Issue in Hyundai145
Like many post-parodic works, Hyundai's commercial expressed a view
of "luxury" that was, in a sense, ambivalent:
[As] explained by Hyundai, "The symbols of 'old' luxury, including the
[Louis Vuitton] Marks, were used as part of the Commercial's humorous
social commentary on the need to redefine luxury during a recession....
The commercial poked fun at these symbols of 'old' luxury to distinguish
them from [Hyundai] in an effort to challenge consumers to rethink what it
means for a product to be luxurious."' 146
In other words, the Hyundai commercial "poked fun" at luxury, not to
swear it off altogether, but rather to redefine the concept. Of course,
Hyundai's desire to have consumers reconsider the meaning of luxury
served the company's own interests, but (as noted in Section II.A) that does
144 Hyundai, 2012 WL 1022247, at *1.
145 Chris Shunk, Hyundai Sued by Louis Vuitton over High-End Basketball, AUTOBLOG (Mar. S,
2010, 11:29 AM), http://www.autoblog.coM/201o/o3/oS/report-hyundai-sued-by-louis-vuitton-over-high-
end-basketball.
146 Hyundai, 2012 WL 1022247, at *2.
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not, factually or doctrinally, undermine the presence of non-commercial
expression in the work.
Indeed, Hyundai emphasized to the court that its use of the Louis Vuitton
imagery was "'expressive' in nature"14 7-but the district court would have
none of it. In a passage that encapsulates nearly everything that is wrong
with-or, at least, woefully antiquated in-trademark law's current parody
doctrine, the court wrote:
[Hyundai's] ad is not expressive in the sense that the word is used in trademark
law .... Hyundai has acknowledged that it intended to make no comment
on the Louis Vuitton mark, but instead offered a broader social critique.
The Second Circuit has deemed such motivations unworthy of protection.1 48
The decisive issue for trademark infringement liability, in the court's
view, was "whether Hyundai Sonata consumers have made misinformed
purchasing decisions based on Louis Vuitton's role in the 'Luxury' ad"-an
issue of which Hyundai had supposedly lost sight in "focus[ing] heavily on
the ad's purportedly expressive nature and the protections that should be
afforded to it.1 49 In a passage that cuts straight to the heart of the crude
and speech-chilling nature of trademark law's rules concerning "parodies,"
the court distinguished earlier cases favoring parodist- defendants by
condemning Hyundai's message as "far more subtle."150
That a work's subtlety was a ticket to a finding of infringement exposes
the cramped, outdated, and arbitrary view of "worthy" speech that now
pervades trademark law's parody doctrine. If this spells bad news for
traditional trademark parodies, it spells near-certain doom for post-parodies.
For the characteristic ambivalence of post-parodic works, as illustrated by
the works depicted in Part I, tends to take visual forms that, like surrealist
art, escapes a definitive, fixed, and readily articulable message. 5 '
Thus, whereas the Haute Diggity Dog panel apparently felt comfortable
grafting its own views of fashion onto the dog toy at issue, the presiding
judge in Hyundai refused to meaningfully engage with the somewhat more
complex expressive content of the defendant's commercial. Instead, the
147 Id. at *9.
148 Id. at *9, *26 (emphasis added).
149 Id. at *21.
150 Id. at *26.
151 As leading social and communication theorists have recognized, "the connection between
speech acts and what the speaker really means to say is never perfect." WUTHNOW ET AL., supra
note 139, at i8S. Where the "speech act" in question takes the form of primarily nonlinguistic
visual imagery, as in many of the Section L.A post-parodies, "the subjective intentions, feelings,
and meaning of the speaker" may not be fully legible to the audience. Id.; see also Eco, supra note
82, at 58-59 (discussing the complexity of signals transmitted through clothing).
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court fell back on the dogmatic, black-or-white, "criticism-or-adulation"
distinction whose absence defines the post-parodic sensibility-a sensibility
that, as explained in Part I, is the inevitable product of recent events in
fashion history, the high-end fashion sector's own business strategies, and
the growing availability of DIY technology to consumer-creators in the
Internet age.
D. Asking the Wrong Question Will Rarely Yield a Helpful Answer
In its current state, trademark law cannot guide judges' evaluation of the
lawfulness of fashion post-parodies in a principled, meaningful way. Courts
presiding over trademark parody cases purport to ask very specific questions.
But that endeavor, when applied to works that do not fall into the narrow
parameters of traditional parodies, will only lead courts to (1) hear something
that isn't there or (2) artificially limit their definition of cognizable speech.
Both the ad hoc nature of the former approach and the categorical prohibition
of the latter will chill a form of creative expression that is valuable, at the
very least, because it empowers consumers who wish to be seen in a visual
culture still controlled in large part by conglomerates whose financial
success often requires managing what consumers do and do not see.
Even if the tradeoff made in current parody doctrine between the rights
of trademark owners and third-party speakers somehow represents desirable
public policy, it is nevertheless indefensible as the proper rule forpost-parodies-
if only because the so-called "articulable message" approach is a conceptual
non sequitur to the post-parodic project.1 2 To try to analyze post-parodic
works, like those pictured in Part I, through trademark law's one-dimensional
parody doctrine is akin to asking whether a personal diary "is persuasive," to
query whether a wholly abstract sculpture "supports fiscal reform," or to
inquire about the "credibility" of a dessert. In each instance, the questioner
attempts to make value judgments about objects whose very nature is alien
to the analytical framework used. The creators of the diary, the sculpture,
and the dessert can no more answer the questions posed than a scientist
could state whether his data is "heartfelt," a political speechwriter could list
the shapes in nature his oratory most closely resembles, or a jury could
evaluate whether a witness's testimony is "ambrosial." Asking the wrong
question will almost always fail to produce an illuminating answer.
152 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, S07 F.3 d 2S2, 26o (4 th Cir.
2007) ("A parody must ... communicate some articulable element of satire, ridicule, joking, or
amusement." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Unfortunately, in the fashion context, at least, federal judges may be
unwilling to make a genuine effort to understand post-parodic works. 53 The
Fourth Circuit judges who read into the Haute Diggity Dog chew toy "a
comment on the rich and famous, on the LOUIS VUITTON name and
related marks, and on conspicuous consumption in general"15 4 arguably
revealed their personal views on the subject of fashion as if through a
Rorschach inkblot test.155
Although the "quite special rage reserved for fashionable dressing [actually
underscores the fact] that dress speaks the irrational-unconscious in a
special way," 156 few federal judges have shown themselves capable of rising
above the fray-of recognizing the "important imaginative function, the
spiritually enlarging character of fashion." '57 This prejudice is as misguided
as it is disappointing. Judges should recognize that, as Elizabeth Wilson has
written, "[ifi the self in all its aspects appears threatened in modern society,
then fashion becomes an important-indeed vital-medium in the recrea-
tion of the lost self," and that "for the individual to lay claim to a particular
style may be more than ever a lifeline, a proof that one does at least exist." '58
Realistically, however, including such florid prose in a judicial opinion, as
one might to bolster a ruling for a post-parodist, would require a judge to
153 See generally Colman, supra note 39, at 57-8 ("[F]ederal judges presiding over [fashion-related]
cases still make their distaste for the subject matter clear .... "). The only plausible alternative to
this account of willful resistance, it would seem, is an inability to appreciate the dynamics in play
when it comes to trademarks, consumer culture, and parodies. See Dreyfuss, supra note 8S, at 293
("[I]t is clear from the way certain judges write that they just don't get it-that they are not
gripped by language and remain unworried by trademark holders' assault on the arsenal guarding
'the vibrancy of our culture.' I wonder, too, about their senses of humor."). It is difficult to say
which of these two possibilities is more worrisome.
154 Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3 d at 261.
155 This phenomenon is likely driven by (largely subconscious) aspects of social behavior and
facilitated by the U.S. legal system's lack of formalized interpretive tools for visual material. I analyze
the former in a working article on judicial projection of internalized social norms -specifically, in the
context of fin-de-sicle design-patent jurisprudence. See Charles E. Colman, Patents and Perverts
(Aug. 1, 2014) (abstract), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract id-2477459.
For an insightful discussion of the latter, see Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (noting that "courts take language seriously" but that "[t]here
are no corresponding traditions in law to guide the interpretation of images," so there is "a danger
that implicit biases and naive realism-the belief that an image represents a transparent window
onto a single truth-will infect judges' decisions" (footnote omitted)).
156 WILSON, supra note 42, at 23S.
157 HOLLANDER, supra note S8, at 20.
158 WILSON, supra note 42, at 122. Some anthropological analysis suggests that the derision
leveled at fashion stems from humans' aversion to "ambiguity in boundaries." Id. at 132.
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reveal a degree of vulnerability-humanity?-that many on the federal bench
deem imprudent on ideological, instrumental, or reputational grounds.5 9
Yet this is precisely the sort of nondogmatic, human response required of
judges presiding over cases implicating First Amendment values. 160 Contra-
ry to the Hyundai court's proclamation that subtle expression is less "wor-
thy" of protection than is blunt (and, in many instances, less effective)
speech, neither First Amendment jurisprudence nor most members of
American society are concerned solely with protecting explicit, targeted,
traditionally political speech. Such speech may be conceptually easier and
less emotionally challenging for judges to address in their decisions, but
surely obstacles of this nature should not drive our jurisprudence.
Instead, the appropriate doctrine governing post-parodies must start by
recognizing that, as professors Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley have
argued, we all "benefit from a culture that allows subtle references and word
play that draws from a variety of cultural reference points .. .even if the
159 Consider once more the following passage by Anne Hollander, who describes the myriad
functions of fashion: "Western fashion offers a visual way out of the trap of tradition, the prison of
unquestioning wisdom. Fashion allows clothing to create an image of skepticism, of comic
possibility, of different powers and alternative thoughts, of manifold chances, of escape from fixed
meanings and fixed roles." HOLLANDER, supra note S8, at 19-20.
Now imagine a judge including that passage, or some variation of it, in a dispositive decision
declining to impose liability on a post-parodic designer. How might the public react? The
following commentary on Justice Anthony Kennedy provides some idea of the risks involved:
[Justice Kennedy apparently] believes it is the role of the Court in general and himself
in particular to align the messy reality of American life with an inspiring and highly
abstracted set of ideals .... [In one reproductive rights opinion, Justice Kennedy in-
cluded] a paean to the "heart of liberty," which he said must include "the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life"-a phrase Scalia archly ridiculed as the "sweet-mystery-of-life passage."
Undaunted, in the partial-birth case, Kennedy included a sweet-mystery-of-fetal-life
passage: "The government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to show its
profound respect for the life within the woman." Never mind that the two sweet
mysteries clash with each other .. . .Anthony Kennedy doesn't much care whether
his abstractions are true; the important thing for him is that he wants them to be true.
Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader: 7he Arrogance of Anthony Kennedy, NEW REPUBLIC (June t6, 2007),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/supreme-leader-the-arrogance-anthony-kennedy.
160 To be clear, I hesitate to place all of post-parodists' eggs in the First Amendment basket,
in part because, as Professor Dreyfuss has suggested, the First Amendment might be "simply too
blunt an instrument to parse rights to individual words; perhaps its focus on the communication of
ideas makes it an inappropriate way to think about the linguistic material by which ideas are
conveyed." Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 6S NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 398 (t99o). Dreyfuss's concern is all the more acute
where "the material by which ideas are conveyed" is not lexical but imagery-based. See supra
Section I.A.
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use causes some level of confusion." 161 Indeed, few would disagree with the
proposition that "the rich connotations and implicit understandings present
in any concrete situation are never captured fully or expressed adequately in
language. 1' 62 Accordingly, courts must recognize the value of post-parodic
imagery's characteristic ambivalence-a state of mind that psychologists
have described as a "structural feature of every image and fantasy," which
can be "therapeutic, imaginative, originating and joining" for both creator
and wearer.163
Of course, courts can only be as sensitive to these delicate social values
as precedent will allow-and prevailing trademark doctrine would require
that the post-parodist fit the square peg of his expressive project into the
round hole of parody jurisprudence. Perhaps this is unsurprising, for
"Western social thought . . . [has] over the centuries developed an almost
institutionalized aversion toward dealing in analytically constructive ways
with ambiguity."1 64 But by imposing its simplistic, mechanical rules on
post-parodists' work, trademark law demands that fashion (and visual art,
more generally) do something contrary to its very nature-that it "speak"
with the precision of linguistic discourse.1 65 Putting words in the mouth of a
parodist (as the Fourth Circuit arguably did in Haute Diggity Dog) is, at best,
unproductive. Requiring an explicit, targeted, single-minded message from
post-parodic works-as the Hyundai court essentially demanded of the
parodist-defendant in that case-is the height of absurdity.
In the coming years, courts will undoubtedly be confronted with disputes
over post-parodies incorporating third-party trademarks, probably in the
form of lawsuits brought by high-end fashion brands whose trademarks and
trade dress are their most precious assets. 166 Federal judges, as the de facto
161 Dogan & Lemley, supra note too, at 48o-8t. Professor Dreyfuss agrees, aptly describing
our current state of affairs:
In an economy in which consumers have immediate access to products and services
everywhere on the globe, in a legal environment in which symbols are protected in
multiple ways, in a culture in which trademarks constitute a significant medium of
expression, freedom from all sources of confusion or dilution is simply not achievable.
Dreyfuss, supra note 8S, at 293.
162 WUTHNOW ET AL., supra note 139, at 194.
163 Garrison, supra note 92, at 229.
164 DAVIS, supra note 42, at 5 n.2.
165 Id. at 13 ("[W]hat most distinguishes clothing as a mode of communication from speech ...
is that . . . differences among clothing signifiers are not nearly as sharply drawn and standardized
as are the spoken sounds employed in a speech community .... ).
166 See Alexandria Symonds, Fashion Logo Parodies, Strictly Tongue in Chic, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/12/12/fashion/fashion-logo-parodies-tshirts-strictly-tongue-
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stewards of trademark law, must avoid both the trap of pseudo-interpretation
and the temptation to fall back on one-dimensional rules that ask the wrong
questions of post-parodists and their works. Instead, courts should recognize
that post-parodies represent an eminently "worthy" medium through which
people can make sense of their complex relationships with branded goods-
objects that serve "not just to fill material needs, but to decipher our social
surroundings, locate our social self, and transmit knowledge about who and
what we are. '167
In sum, post-parodists' sensibility and creative output are new, different,
and important. Unfortunately, current trademark doctrine cannot sensitively
and sensibly determine the lawfulness of post-parodic goods. This Essay is
not the place to craft the contours of more appropriate doctrinal framework,
161
but I hope the reader now understands my account of the emerging
post-parodic sensibility and the reasons for its incompatibility with trademark
law's current parody doctrine. I cannot, of course, prove without a doubt
that the fashion I have presented here embodies a new aesthetic, or that its
spirit reflects the particular confluence of historical, economic, and psychological
factors I have identified. Ultimately, the question is one of individual
interpretation. And that is precisely the point.
in-chic.html (discussing how, despite the rise of parodic clothing, "[s]ome brands are concerned
their market value is being diluted by the existence of parody items" and may take legal action).
167 WUTHNOW ET AL., supra note 139, at tt6. See generally MARY DOUGLAS & BARON ISHER-
WOOD, THE WORLD OF GOODS: TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSUMPTION xxiv
(Routledge 2001) (1979) ("[G]oods are like flags. We ought to know how goods work as communi-
cators, or rather, since the goods are not active agents, only signals, we ought to know how they
are used.").
168 Should I revisit this topic in in the future, my proposed approach will likely be informed by
(t) what I suspect to be an ultimately irreconcilable conflict between the post-parodic project and
certain widely accepted, but misguided, assumptions about U.S. trademark law; and (2) the severe
interpretive constraints of both judges and juries, at least in the realm of visual imagery. See
Porter, supra note 155 ("[I]n the realm of the visual, where interpretation can seem largely or
wholly organic, it is [easy to overlook] the unspoken arguments or narratives an image tells.").
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